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Abstract
In this paper I aim to investigate Hume’s well-known distinction between 
impressions and ideas, following the methodology of the history of ideas, and 
showing its specificity and suggesting a possible source, which has not been given 
much attention by the scholarship, namely the logical doctrines of the physician and 
anatomist William Harvey, which provide the key concepts to understand Hume’s 
logic of ideas. After some introductory remarks, the second part deals with the many 
issues involved in Hume’s distinction, and in the third part I examine Harvey’s logic 
of ideas. In conclusion I assess Hume’s debt to the English physician.
Keywords: Hume, Harvey, Impressions, Ideas, Logic.
Resumen
En este artículo se pretende investigar la conocida distinción de Hume entre im-
presiones e ideas, siguiendo la metodología de la historia de las ideas, y mostrando 
su especificidad a la par que se sugiere una posible fuente a la que la investigación 
no ha prestado excesiva atención, esto es, las doctrinas lógicas del médico y ana-
tomista William Harvey. Éstas ofrecen los conceptos clave para entender la lógica 
* Quotations are from the critical edition, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume: E=An 
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006); T=Treatise of the Human Nature, edited by David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2007), 1-405. Norton’s edition of the Treatise contains also the Abstract=A.
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de las ideas humeana. Tras algunas consideraciones introductorias, la segunda parte 
trata de numerosas cuestiones presentes en la distinción de Hume, y en la tercera 
parte se examina la lógica de las ideas de Harvey. En la conclusión se pone de ma-
nifiesto la deuda de Hume hacia el médico inglés.
Palabras clave: Hume, Harvey, Impresiones, Ideas, Lógica.
I. Introduction
Scholars of Hume have often treated the “impression-idea” distinction as a 
commonplace. It is a quite simple doctrine, and from the psychological standpoint 
not very innovative: external objects affect the mind, producing impressions, and 
from them are generated ideas. This process of reflection from things to impressions 
and then to ideas has a long history traceable directly to Aristotle’s doctrines in his 
book On the soul 3.3.1 But Hume’s distinction is a part of a broader and more complex 
epistemological account that involves various aspects and elements of the so-called 
facultative logic, or logic of ideas, which arose in the mid-seventeenth century.2 
I aim to show that the Humean distinction is not so easily inscribable within the 
context of the various epistemological attempts developed in the late seventeenth 
and the early eighteenth century, and that if its psychological aspect is quite simple, 
the same cannot be said about the epistemic standpoint of Hume’s theory of 
knowledge.3 In fact, Hume’s distinction, despite all the other approaches elaborated 
in that period, presents some peculiarities, which could characterize a second and 
1 We must be careful to distinguish “reflection” as a process of mirroring (or copying) a thing, an 
image or an idea in the mind, just as a beam of light reflects on glass or a body reflects in a mirror, 
from “reflection” as a process of the mind to take notice of its states and operations, such as perceiving, 
thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, willing etc.
2 On facultative logic or logic of ideas cf. James G. Buickerood, “The Natural History of the 
Understanding: Locke and the Rise of Facultative Logic in the Eighteenth Century,” History and 
Philosophy of Logic, 6 (1985): 157-190; Sylvain Auroux, La logique des idées (Montréal: Bellarmin, 
1993); Frederick S. Michael, Why Logic Became Epistemology: Gassendi, Port Royal and the 
Reformation in Logic, in Patricia A. Easton (ed.), Logic and the Workings of the Mind (Atascadero: 
Ridgeview, 1997), 1-20.
3 Epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge and of the various degrees of belief and evidence. 
Hume explicitly characterizes his work as an epistemic logic: “The celebrated Monsieur Leibnitz 
has observed it to be a defect in the common systems of logic, that they are very copious when they 
explain the operations of the understanding in the forming of demonstrations, but are too concise when 
they treat of probabilities, and those other measures of evidence on which life and action entirely 
depend … The author of the Treatise of Human Nature seems to have been sensible of this defect 
in these philosophers, and has endeavoured, as much as he can, to supply it (A, 408).” Cf. Jaakko 
Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1962).
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revolutionary “new way of ideas” after that of Locke.4 Not by chance, Wolfgang 
H. Müller in his entry “Eindruck” in the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 
states that Hume is credited with having introduced into the philosophical lexicon for 
the first time the concept of an “impression”, and with having consistently opposed 
to it the concept of an “idea”.5 What is particular in the Humean “impression-idea” 
distinction that makes it so historically innovative from the epistemic standpoint? 
Two simple things: 1) ideas are copies of impressions; 2) impressions are more 
vivid, clear, and distinct than ideas, and therefore they have higher epistemic value 
‒ that is to say, they provide a better knowledge of their object. These are two 
original elements in the history of logic and of epistemology because the former 
inverts the prevailing Platonic belief that images and impressions are copies of 
ideas, and the latter inverts the common (e.g. Lockean) position that ideas are the 
first object of knowledge.
Intellectual historians have not given extensive consideration to these two 
aspects,6 while philosophers have focused on the theoretical import of this approach 
and on its consistency, without advancing any historical claim.7 The present study 
aims to analyze the Humean distinction from a historical perspective, demonstrating 
its particular features and suggesting a possible source, which has been given little 
attention by previous scholars,8 namely the logical doctrines of the physician and 
anatomist William Harvey. 
II. Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas
Hume introduces the “impression-idea” distinction for the first time in his 
Treatise of Human Nature (1739), and he recalls it in An Enquiry concerning 
4 Cf. John W. Yolton, “John Locke and the Seventeenth-Century Logic of Ideas,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 16 (1955); 431-52; Robert McRae, “Idea as a Philosophical Term in the Seventeenth 
Century,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 26 (1965): 175-190; John W. Yolton, “Ideas and Knowledge 
in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13 (1975): 145-65. 
5 Wolfgang Hermann Müller, Eindruck, in Joachim Ritter (ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie vol. 4 (Basel: Schwabe, 1972), 4681-84.
6 Cf. John W. Yolton, Hume’s Ideas, in Id., Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 181-202.
7 Cf. Saul Traiger, “Impressions, Ideas, and Fictions,” Hume Studies, 13 (1987): 381-99; Wayne 
Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Harold 
W. Noonan, Hume on Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1999), 51-90; Jonathan Bennet, Learning from 
Six Philosophers, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 197-220; Janet Broughton, Impressions and 
Ideas,” in Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s “Treatise” (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006), 43-58; Don Garrett, Hume’s Theory of Ideas, in Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.), A 
Companion to Hume (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 41-57.
8 For a complete survey of Hume’s sources for his philosophy of mind, cf. Oliver A. Johnson, The 
Mind of David Hume: A Companion to Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1995), 15-36.
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Human Understanding (1748/1758). In both works, the distinction occupies a 
prominent position in Hume’s logic, appearing in the first chapter devoted to the 
explanation of the origin of ideas. 
In the initial statement of the Treatise Hume asserts that all the perceptions of 
the human mind are of two distinct kinds: impressions and ideas. He also adds that 
“it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction,” 
as if this distinction were an established commonplace. But in reality things are 
different and Hume is aware of his conceptual innovation, stating that:
I here make use of these terms, impression and idea, in a sense different from what 
is usual, and I hope this liberty will be allow’d me. Perhaps I rather restore the word, 
idea, to its original sense, from which Mr. Locke had perverted it, in making it stand 
for all our perceptions. By the term of impression I wou’d not be understood to express 
the manner in which our lively perceptions are produced in the soul, but merely the 
perceptions themselves; for which there is no particular name either in the English or 
any other language that I know of (T, 7).
The passage of the Treatise has a counterpart in the Enquiry:
Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, 
which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forci-
ble and lively are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. The other species want a 
name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for 
any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let 
us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Impressions; employing that word in a 
sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our 
more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. 
And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, 
of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements 
above mentioned (E, 13).
These two passages reveal three important issues related to Hume’s distinction. 
First, he aims to restore the original meaning of the word “idea;” second, he does 
not follow Locke’s doctrine that an idea “stands for whatsoever is the object of 
the understanding when a man thinks … or whatever it is which the mind can be 
employed about in thinking;”9 third, there was no corresponding English word 
for his notion of “impression” as “lively perception,” and therefore his usage is a 
complete novelty in the philosophical lexicon. Hume clarifies these three claims in 
his further treatment of the distinction, but they still remain very problematic.
The main difference between impressions and ideas lies in the degrees of force 
and liveliness with which they affect the mind and make their way into thought. 
9 John Locke, The Works of John Locke vol. 1 (London: Rivington, 1824), 6.
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Perceptions that affect the mind with the most “force and violence” are impressions 
and under this name Hume comprehends all sensations, passions, and emotions, as 
they make their first and original appearance in the soul. By ideas, he means the 
faint and bland images of the impressions in thinking and reasoning (T, 7). For 
Hume, this distinction is as clear and requires as little explanation as that between 
feeling and thinking:
There is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man 
feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he af-
terwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination (E, 
13).
The mind, according to Hume, readily and naturally distinguishes the variations 
of degree between impressions and ideas, as it clearly perceives the differences 
when one is feeling, remembering, imagining, and thinking, even if in particular 
circumstances impressions and ideas may very nearly approach each other so that 
they seem similar, because the latter can be so faint as to be indistinguishable from 
the former.
Impressions and ideas differ in their degree of force and vivacity, but they have 
a “great resemblance” among them, so much so that ideas seem to be the reflection 
of the impressions. In fact, the faculties of the mind can copy the perceptions of the 
senses in the intellect, but they can never entirely reach the force and liveliness of 
the original feeling (T, 8). For this reason all perceptions present a double aspect, 
appearing as both impressions and ideas. Hume’s example is particularly clear: 
when we shut our eyes and think of our chamber, the ideas that we form are exact 
representations of the impressions we felt. Thus Hume establishes his so-called 
“copy principles”, according to which “ideas and impressions appear always to 
correspond to each other (T, 8).” The correspondence between impressions and 
ideas is first of all a relation of resemblance between them based on reflection, 
and in particular Hume points out that the ideas resemble impressions; in fact, 
considering the order of appearance, impressions always take precedence over 
their corresponding ideas: any impression either of the mind or body is constantly 
followed by an idea, which resembles it and differs only in its degree of force and 
liveliness, while ideas never produce corresponding impressions (T, 8). Hume’s 
original standpoint reverses the relation of resemblance between impressions and 
ideas that was conceived within the Platonic tradition.
In the tenth book of the Republic, in dealing with the power of the Demiurge 
to imitate the eternal ideas, Plato asserts that human beings are also able to imitate 
ideas: it would be as if “to take a mirror and carry it about everywhere” (596D-
E). In this way we can “speedily produce the sun and all the things in the sky, 
and speedily the earth and [our]self and the other animals and implements and 
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plants and all the objects” (596 E). But Plato is aware that all the things mirrored 
are nothing more than appearances, and not realities. The painter operates in a 
similar way in producing the appearance of something: he paints something that 
resembles a real being but is not that ‒ it is “only a faint adumbration in comparison 
with reality” (597 A). According to Plato, impressions, images and everything that 
comes from sensation are only faint and dim appearances of the ideas: only ideas 
retain truth and reality. Therefore, while for Platonists perceptions and impressions 
resemble ideas and are copies of them, for the Scottish philosopher it is exactly the 
reverse. Hume’s anti-Platonic approach is striking because the philosopher aims to 
“restore the word, idea, to its original sense,” but its original meaning is evidently 
the exemplar of sensations, impressions, and perceptions and not the faint copy of 
them. From where does Hume get his view about the original meaning of “idea”? 
Why does he consider his the traditional sense and the oldest? Scholarship has never 
provided satisfactory answers to these questions, but a careful analysis of Hume’s 
distinction may help to solve the problem.
Hume goes further in dividing all ideas and impressions into simple and complex. 
He states that many complex ideas never have impressions corresponding to them 
and that many complex impressions are not exactly copied in ideas: 
I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and 
walls are rubies, tho’ I never saw any such. I have seen Paris; but shall I affirm I can 
form such an idea of that city, as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in 
their real and just proportions? (T, 8)
Hume concludes that there is no universally true rule by which complex ideas 
can be shown to be exact copies of impressions, but it is certain that “all our simple 
ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are 
correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent” (T, 9).
The difference of degree in force and liveliness between impressions and ideas 
lies in their different origins. Since impressions are prior to their corresponding 
ideas, the origin of the latter depends on that of the former. Impressions can be 
generated either by sensation or by reflection. Generation by sensation is almost 
obscure for Hume; in fact, impressions of sensation “arise in the soul originally, 
from unknown causes” (E, 131):
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my 
opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ’twill always be impossible to 
decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc’d 
by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv’d from the author of our being (T, 59).
It is not Hume’s specific purpose to explain how impressions arise from the senses, 
for, in his logic of ideas, it is sufficient to draw “inferences from the coherence of 
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our perceptions, whether they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, 
or be mere illusions of the senses” (T, 59).10 The task must be accomplished by 
“anatomists and natural philosophers” (T, 11). Hume is probably arguing that only 
anatomists and natural philosophers can provide a full explanation of the hidden 
and obscure processes concerning our sense organs, nerves, and brains. This is an 
important remark, as we shall see, in connection with Hume’s characterization of 
his method of enquiry as an “anatomy” of the human mind based upon experience 
(A, 407).
However, despite this limitation and even without an account of the generation 
of impressions from sensation, Hume’s ambition is to explain the formation of 
impressions from reflection, which are based on the generation of ideas from 
sensation: thus, the process of transition from impressions of sensation to ideas of 
sensation becomes central to understand all mental activities. 
We can find a sort of explanation of this reflective process in the Treatise. The 
solution is not completely new in the history of philosophy, and is connected with 
the various interpretations of the Aristotelian passage at Posterior Analytics 2.19, 
where the Stagirite explains the formation of notions from sensation as a form of 
sublimation. The process of forming an idea of sensation in Hume is quite similar. 
An impression first affects the senses and makes the mind perceive pleasure or 
displeasure, hot or cold, sweet or bitter etc. Of this impression a copy is generated 
in the mind and remains after the impression ceases: this is what Hume calls an 
“idea.” When this idea operates in the soul, causing for instance the feeling of 
love or of fear, it generates impressions of reflection, in such a way that the latter 
are antecedent to their own corresponding ideas, but always posterior to the ideas 
of sensation, from which they are derived (T, 11). But impressions of reflection 
can be copied by memory and imagination, becoming ideas of reflection. These 
various reflective processes of transition from impressions of sensation to ideas of 
sensation, and again from impressions of reflection to ideas of reflection, imply a 
sort of “distortion” or “refraction” of the copies, just as light is distorted when it 
travels through a glass, otherwise ideas would be identical to impressions. In this 
distortion, ideas lose some of the force and liveliness of the impressions. When any 
impression has already been present in the mind and makes its second appearance 
as an idea, it is recalled either by memory or by imagination: by memory perception 
retains its first vivacity, while in imagination the perception is faint and languid ‒ 
that is, “it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea” (T, 11).11 Hume provides 
a noteworthy example of this loss of vivacity:
10 In the Abstract Hume points out that the final end of his epistemology is to elaborate a logic to 
explain the principles and the operations of the mind and the nature of ideas (A, 407).
11 On various degrees of force and liveliness of ideas in memory, cf. Oliver Johnson, “Lively Memory 
and Past Memory,” Hume Studies, 13 (1987): 343-59.
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A painter, who intended to represent a passion or emotion of any kind, wou’d endeavour 
to get a sight of a person actuated by a like emotion, in order to enliven his ideas, 
and give them a force and vivacity superior to what is found in those, which are mere 
fictions of the imagination. The more recent this memory is, the clearer is the idea; and 
when after a long interval he would return to the contemplation of his object, he always 
find its idea to be much decay’d, if not wholly obliterated (T, 60).
Hume is undoubtedly attacking Plato’s doctrine by diminishing the role of the 
ideas in favour of the impressions. He individuates three kinds of relation between 
impressions and ideas, which respectively characterize three different degrees of 
vivacity: 1) the object is present, the idea is as vivid as the impression; 2) the object 
is absent, it is remembered, the idea is faint and languid corresponding to how 
recent the memory is; 3) the object is absent, it is imagined, the idea is very faint 
and it is called properly by its name. This process of sublimation and vanishing of 
the vivacity is crucial in Hume’s epistemic logic because upon it depends our degree 
of assent to or belief in knowledge:
… belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the 
vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from 
the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, 
or a repetition of that impression in the memory. ’Tis merely the force and liveliness of 
the perception, which constitutes the first act of the judgment, and lays the foundation 
of that reasoning, which we build upon it, when we trace the relation of cause and 
effect (T, 61).
The force and liveliness of the perceptions distinguish the epistemic value 
between impressions and ideas. Impressions are more vivid and therefore have 
a superior epistemic value to that of ideas ‒ that is, they 1) render realities more 
present to the mind than fictions, 2) cause them to weigh more in the thought, and 
3) give them a superior influence on the passions and imagination (T, 68). Hume’s 
standpoint is therefore the opposite of that of the Platonic tradition, which attributed 
to the ideas the highest epistemic value and reduced impressions to mere illusions. 
According to Hume, impressions are vivid and distinct and provide a clear and 
precise knowledge, while ideas are obscure, so difficult to know that they can be 
confused with each other: 
All ideas … are naturally faint and obscure: the mind has but a slender hold of them: 
they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; … On the contrary, all 
impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: the 
limits between them are more exactly determined; nor is it easy to fall into any error or 
mistake with regard to them (E, 16).
In Hume, impressions and ideas differ not only in regard to their epistemic 
value in vivacity and liveliness, but also in regard to their application. In fact, 
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all impressions and ideas are particular in their nature, but the latter can serve 
as universals. This is the specific case of abstract ideas, which are in themselves 
individual, but may become general in their representation (T, 18). This kind of 
application is possible for Hume because the mind collects all possible determinations 
(especially the degrees of quantity and quality) of particular things, and when it 
finds resemblance among several objects––whatever differences it may observe in 
the degrees of their quantity and quality and whatever other differences may appear 
among them––it applies the same general name to all of them in such a way that it 
forms a general abstract idea. In referring frequently to these kind of ideas, which 
are particular in their nature but serve as general notions, the mind acquires the 
habit of surveying all the similar particulars that fall under the idea. Therefore a 
particular idea becomes general by being annexed to a general term, which “from 
a customary conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas, and readily 
recalls them in the imagination” (T, 20). Hume concludes that if ideas are particular 
in their nature and finite in their number, deriving from their respective impressions, 
it is “only by custom they can become general in their representation, and contain an 
infinite number of other ideas under them” (T, 21). Only custom as a habit therefore 
distinguishes ideas from impressions in their application and can provide general 
ideas, which the mind often uses in its reasonings (T, 20). 
In the Enquiry, in dealing with the “impression-idea” distinction, Hume 
introduces another important topic concerning innate ideas. He argues against 
Locke’s criticism of innatism and his conception of ideas as standing for every 
perception, sensation, and passion, as well as thought. Admitting the “impression-
idea” distinction in the sense explained above, Hume understands by innate “what 
is original or copied from no precedent perception,” in such a way that “all our 
impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate” (E, 16). Hume is claiming that 
innate means something original, such as the impressions of sensation, from which 
the derived knowledge of ideas proceeds, and he believes that “no more was meant 
by those, who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions” 
(E, 16). On one side Hume is attacking Locke’s conception of innatism, according 
to which ideas are something inborn in the mind, and on the other side he is 
criticizing Plato’s doctrine that ideas are eternal exemplars of natural things. But 
in this passage, Hume seems also to solve the vicious circle of the Aristotelian 
doctrine that all knowledge is framed out of preceding knowledge, which at the 
time was considered by the Aristotelians as a form of innatism.12 In fact, either 
all knowledge comes from preceding knowledge, in which case the latter would 
12 Among the many English Aristotelians of the time that deal with the problem of this form of inna-
tism see John Flavell, Tractatus de demonstratione methodicus et polemicus (Oxford: Lichfield, 1619), 
b. 2, 108-109: “omnis cognitio intellectiva oritur ex praecedente cognitione: non autem ex praecedente 
cognitione intellectiva (ita enim daretur processus in infinitum) ergo praecedente sensitiva.”
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also have to come from preceding knowledge, and so on ad infinitum, rendering 
all knowledge impossible, or knowledge comes from preceding innate knowledge. 
But since no inborn knowledge is possible, according to the Aristotelian view of the 
intellect as a tabula rasa, the latter case would have resulted in a paradox. But if by 
“innate”, in Hume’s words, we understand the original knowledge that is produced 
in its first appearance by sensation through impressions, the Aristotelian statement 
that all knowledge comes from previous knowledge is easily explainable: it means 
no more than that ideas and impressions of reflection are always derived from the 
impressions of sensation, which are original and for this reason innate. In Hume’s 
mind, Locke’s criticism means that ideas are not innate because prior to ideas there 
are impressions, but since Locke deals with both ideas and impressions, we can say 
that for Hume the Lockean standpoint is definitely wrong since he does not admit 
either innate or original impressions in that sense (A, 408-409).
Hume’s distinction therefore has the following peculiar characteristics in 
comparison to the “old” and “new” “way of ideas”: 1) ideas are copies of impressions 
and derived from them; 2) the original sense of “idea” is to be a copy, in opposition 
to the Platonic tradition; 3) there was no specific word in the English language to 
express his notion of “impression”; 4) impressions and ideas differ in degree of 
force and liveliness, the former providing a more precise and distinct knowledge; 
5) there are complex ideas without any corresponding impression, they are mere 
fictions of the mind; 6) the process of formation of an idea from the impression, 
through memory and imagination, implies a loss of vivacity; 7) the explanation 
of this process pertains to anatomists and natural philosophers; 8) impressions of 
sensation are innate in the sense that they are original and not copies of something 
else, and are grounds of the knowledge of ideas. 
Hume’s conception of the “impression-idea” distinction is highly original and 
complex, and it has been considered a novelty in the history of philosophy, but we 
can find a similar account in William Harvey’s logic of ideas, which was probably 
the source of the Scottish philosopher’s distinction.
III. Harvey’s logic of ideas
Harvey is one the most famous and most studied physicians in the history of 
medicine for his discovery of the circulation of the blood, but scholarship has often 
neglected his contribution to the field of the logic of ideas, presented in the preface 
to his Exercitationes de generatione animalium (1651),13 where he outlines the 
method of the anatomist in acquiring scientific knowledge. In this short preface, 
13 Cf. William Harvey, Exercitationes de generatione animalium (=GA) (Elzeviri: Amsterdam, 1651). 
The English quotations are from William Harvey, Anatomical Exercitations, concerning the Genera-
tion of Living Creatures (=AE) (London: Young, 1653). The original spelling has been retained.
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Harvey develops a logic which closely follows the Aristotelian methodology that he 
learned in his youth in Padua.14 Harvey’s logic of ideas “in terms of the discussion 
of method, the structure of science, how knowledge is obtained, … is very close” 
to the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Aristotelian treatises of logic 
such as Jacopo Zabarella’s Opera logica (1589), but applied to a specific, concrete 
empirical science.15 
According to Harvey, there is only one way to acquire knowledge, and this 
proceeds from what is most knowable to what is less knowable, from what is more 
evident to what is more obscure. Science has the aim of acquiring knowledge of 
the most general ideas, and the mind itself reasons from these ideas to particulars. 
However, the understanding of general ideas by the mind, and in particular by the 
intellect, is grounded on the perception of individual things by means of sensation. 
Thus for Harvey it is necessary to explain how the mind grasps general ideas from 
particulars (GA, 19; AE, a6v-a7v). 
All knowledge begins from sensation and proceeds from a precise knowledge 
of the particulars to a confused knowledge of the general ideas. The object of 
knowledge is always perceived as singular from the external sensation; but when 
the impression of the external senses is abstracted from the thing itself, and judged 
and conceived by inner sense, it becomes something faint and more general.16 
According to Harvey, in its loss of vivacity an idea loses its specific determinations, 
becoming more general. If we have clear and direct perception of a distinct person 
(an impression by sensation of it, in Hume’s words), we can say that it is either 
Socrates or Callias, but if we see the same person from afar, we are no longer 
able to distinguish Socrates from Callias; rather, we recognize a person, who, in 
Harvey’s eyes, is always something singular, but in the mind is a confused general 
idea of what we see from afar, which operates as a universal that can be applied 
to both Socrates and Callias. If it is true for Harvey that there are no universals in 
nature, he argues that a particular can serve as a universal when our perception of 
it is not clear enough to distinguish it from other particulars (GA, 19; AE, a6v-a7v). 
The association of a particular impression with a more general idea is possible 
for Harvey only when the mind has acquired the habit or the custom of using the 
14 On Harvey’s Aristotelianism, cf. Charles Schmitt, William Harvey and Renaissance Aristotelianism. 
The Praefatio to De generatione animalium (1651), in Rudolf Schmitz and Gundolf Keil (eds.), Hu-
manismus und Medizin (Acta Humaniora: Weinheim, 1984), 117-38. 
15 Ibid. 124.
16 It is noteworthy that Harvey uses the notion “impression” in his work (GA, 26-27; AE, a11r-a12v), 
but he refers to it also with other expressions such as “sensation”, “perception”, “what is abstracted 
from sensation”, etc., which in Hume’s vocabulary characterizes the impressions of sensation. Cf. 
Kenneth R. Merrill, Historical Dictionary of Hume’s Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2008), 
207-213. In this sense, the absence of a consistent terminology in Harvey’s philosophy may justify 
Hume’s complaint about the lack of a specific word for “impression”.
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latter instead of the former for many particulars, in such a way that at first when 
we see something from afar, we refer to it as a general idea, like a person, and then 
on closer perception we identify the person with Socrates or Callias (GA, 26; AE, 
a8v-a9r). Harvey’s account of the acquisition of general abstract ideas by means of 
custom is similar to that developed by Hume, and, as we shall see below, they also 
share the conception that in their application and employment ideas can serve as 
universal (GA, 23; AE, a9r).
Harvey points out that a singular impression is clear and distinct, but appears 
confused and indistinct 1) when the object is removed from sight; 2) when it 
becomes abstracted by the imagination; or 3) when it is retained in the memory 
‒ just as Hume indicates in his Treatise. In these cases the singular impression is 
conceived as a faint and confused idea (GA, 21; AE, a8r). Therefore, according to 
Harvey, impressions are vivid and distinct because they refer immediately to the 
singular perception, while the idea is confused and indistinct because it no longer 
refers immediately to the object in its vivacity and liveliness. 
In order to make his position clear, Harvey refers directly to Seneca’s fifty-
eighth Epistle, in which occurs the same metaphor of the painter used by Hume 
(and by Plato in the Republic):
This subtilty Seneca doth elegantly express, according to Plato’s opinion. An idea, saith 
he, is an eternal Exemplar of Natural things. I will explain this definition, that you may 
conceive it the better. Suppose I intend to draw your picture, you your self are the Exem-
plar of that picture, from whom my mind takes a representation, which she indeavoureth 
to pattern in her work. So then your face, which is my director, et which I labour to 
represent is the Idea. And a little after, he saith. In my discourse even now I made use of 
a picture-drawer, to illustrate what I was speaking of. He, when he would paint Virgil, 
his eye is upon Virgil himself: Virgils face is his Idea, and the Exemplar of his future 
designe: now that which the Artist takes from this Idea, and worketh off, is the Picture. 
If you demand the difference between these two, it is this: one is the Pattern, the other 
is the copy taken by the Pattern, and layed upon the work: He imitates the one, and 
makes the other. A statue hath a face, but that face is but the Idos, or representation: 
But the Exemplar which the Statuary copies out, hath a face, and that face is the Idea. 
Doe you desire a farther explication? Take it thus. The Idos is that which you see in the 
piece: the Idea is quite without the piece, and not only without it, but also had a being 
before the piece was at all (GA, 21-22; AE, a8r-a9v). 
In his letter Seneca, following Plato, seeks to emphasize the ontological and 
epistemological primacy of the ideas over impressions and sensations, whereas 
Harvey reverses the two terms and interprets the passage as indicating the opposite. 
Commenting on this passage, Harvey writes that the perception of the sensible 
object differs from the perception which is kept in memory and in imagination. The 
impression of sensation is the exemplar, the Platonic idea, the natural thing, the form 
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informing, while the perception in memory and in imagination is a representation, a 
resemblance, a similitude, a being of reason (GA, 23; AE, a9r).17 He adds
That, [impression] is imployed about some particular thing, and is it selfe a singular, 
and an individual; this [idea], is a kinde of universal and common thing. [Impression] 
is in every Artist and Philosopher, a sensible thing, clear, and perfect; this [idea] be-
longs to the mind, and is obscure. For what we discover by sense is much more sure 
and manifest, then what we discover by the intellect: because the latter springs from the 
former, and is illustrated by it (GA, 23; AE, a9r).
Harvey reverses the epistemic relation between impressions and ideas, and 
impressions become the exemplars, while ideas become the copies and the 
resemblances. Impressions are, according to Harvey’s standpoint, more sure, clear, 
and manifest and always concern singular things, while ideas are obscure simply 
because they are faint and blurred and they can serve as universal. Moreover, Harvey 
also states that ideas derive from impressions through a process of sublimation in 
which impressions lose their vivacity. On this issue, Harvey’s doctrines really seem 
to be the source of Hume’s epistemic inversion of impressions and ideas, and also of 
their respective characterizations as vivid or faint objects of the mind. This can also 
explain why Hume believed he was restoring the ancient sense of the notion “idea”: 
he understood Plato’s conception through Harvey’s interpretation of Seneca’s letter. 
Hume’s assignment of the task of investigating the origin of the distinction between 
impressions and ideas to the anatomist and natural philosopher may be referred 
directly to Harvey ‒ or at least the Scottish philosopher had in mind Harvey’s 
anatomical and physical investigations on this matter. 
But this is not all. Harvey also discusses the issue of innate ideas, as Hume does. 
According to Harvey, the mind contains nothing from birth: no innate knowledge, 
no ideas, and no customs. All knowledge is acquired through sensation (GA, 25; AE, 
a10r-a10v), even if this position seems to be in contrast to the Aristotelian statement 
that all knowledge comes from previous knowledge, which can be considered, 
as we have seen, as a particular kind of innatism. Harvey solves the problem by 
examining the passage of Posterior Analytics 2.19: 
By Sense there remains an impression of the thing perceived; by that impression is 
made a remembrance of it, and from multiplied memory, proceeds Experience: from 
Experience, Universal Reason … no perfect knowledge, which may be called ours, is 
17 The Latin is particularly significant: “In utrisque differt id, quod in rebus sensibilibus speculamur; 
a spectro ipso, quod in phantasia, vel memoria retinetur. Illud exemplar, Idea, forma informans; hoc 
imitamentum, Idos, species abstracta. Illud res naturalis, ens reale; hoc repraesentatio, sive similitudo, 
et ens rationis.” The use of the verb “speculor” and the name “spectrum” are very significant in 
characterizing Harvey’s epistemological language concerning the reflective process of the generation 
of images and ideas from sensation. Images and ideas are mental mirrors of the things directly 
perceived by sensation.
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in us; but such as is in some sort derived to us from Experience, and Sense; or is at 
least examined, and approved by them, and strongly grounded upon some knowledge 
pre-existent in us. For without memory, there can be no experience which is nothing 
else but a multiplied memory: neither can memory bee, without a remaining impression 
of the sensitive object, and the object cannot remain where it never was (GA, 27-28; 
AE, a11v-a12r). 
Knowledge of the object by impression of sensation differs from knowledge 
by general idea: the ‘precedent knowledge’ is required only for the knowledge of 
ideas and is garnered only through the impressions that come from sensation. No 
knowledge of ideas would be possible without a pre-existing knowledge of the 
impression. Therefore, Harvey concludes, sensible knowledge can be conceived as 
innate and inborn insofar as it concerns the first appearance of knowledge and is 
the original cognition from which ideas arise.
In many points Harvey’s logic of ideas seems to be the source of Hume’s 
inspiration in conceiving his “impression-idea” distinction. It is not possible to find 
in any other early modern author ––certainly not in Locke, nor in Burthogge, nor 
Carmichael, nor Berkeley–– 1) such a characterization of the idea as a faint copy 
of the impression, 2) the inversion of epistemic value between impression and idea, 
and 3) the conception of the impression of sensation as inborn knowledge from 
which ideas are derived. It remains to be considered how Harvey could have been 
a source of Hume’s doctrines.
III. Hume and Harvey
In his entire work, Hume explicitly mentions the English physician just once, in 
his History of England (1754-1762), but it is very significant because it reveals his 
knowledge not only of Harvey’s famous discovery of the circulation of the blood, 
but also of his lesser-known anatomical investigations on the generation of animals:
Harvey is intitled to the glory of having made, by reasoning alone, without any mixture 
of accident, a capital discovery in one of the most important branches of science. He had 
also the happiness of establishing at once his theory on the most solid and convincing 
proofs; and posterity has added little to the arguments suggested by his industry and 
ingenuity. His treatise of circulation of the blood is farther embellished by that warmth 
and spirit which so naturally accompany the genius of invention. This great man was 
much favoured by Charles I, who gave him the liberty of using all the deer in the royal 
forest for perfecting his discoveries on the generation of animals.18
18 David Hume, The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688, 
vol. 4, ed. by William B. Todd (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983), 153.
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We may suppose that Hume had in his hands on at least one occasion a copy 
of Harvey’s De generatione animalium, probably in the English version, since he 
complains about the absence of a specific word for “impression” in English. There is 
nothing by Harvey in the catalogue of Hume’s library, although it is well known that 
the compilation is not exhaustive.19 We know that Hume spent much time studying 
at the well-furnished Library of the Advocates in Edinburgh since his university 
years (1725-1729), well before 1752 when he was nominated library keeper. But 
more importantly, Hume was involved in the newly-founded Royal College of 
Physicians of Edinburgh, of which he was secretary and editor of the proceedings 
of the society––Essays and Observations, Physical and Literary––with Alexander 
Monro, professor of anatomy at Edinburgh University.20 Michael Barfoot’s accurate 
study has shown that Hume’s interests in physiology and anatomy can be dated back 
to the 1720s and 30s, and therefore we may suppose that during these years he  was 
concerned with these issues and read various publications on the topic.21
In the Enquiry there is a significant reference––albeit implicit––in which Hume 
is undoubtedly thinking of Harvey:
The anatomical observations, formed upon one animal, are, by this species of reasoning, 
extended to all animals; and it is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for 
instance, is clearly proved to have place in one creature, as a frog, or fish, it forms a 
strong presumption, that the same principle has place in all (E, 79).
Hume therefore must have had some acquaintance and familiarity with Harvey’s 
works and doctrines. But probably the most important indication of Harvey’s 
influence on Hume is the latter’s constant reference to his own epistemological 
project as an “accurate anatomy of human nature” (T, 171). The method consists 
in a careful study of the human mind in all its facets, with respect to the cognitive 
process as well as to moral behaviour. The examination by means of observations 
and experiments on one mind is applicable to all mankind, just as the study of the 
anatomists on a specific body can provide precious information on the structure of 
all bodies. In section twelve, “Of The Pride and Humility of Animals”, Hume is 
quite clear how this method must be applied:
’Tis usual with anatomists to join their observations and experiments on human bodies 
to those on beasts, and from the agreement of these experiments to derive an additional 
19 Cf. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (eds.), The David Hume Library (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
Bibliographical Society, 1996).
20 Cf. The Early Days of The Royall Colledge of Phisitians, Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Johnston, 1899), 
134-36. 
21 Cf. Michael Barfoot, Hume and the Culture of Science in the Eighteenth Century, in M.A. Stewart 
(ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 151-
90.
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argument for any particular hypothesis. ’Tis indeed certain, that where the structure of 
parts in brutes is the same as in men, and the operation of these parts also the same, 
the causes of that operation cannot be different, and that whatever we discover to be 
true of the one species, may be concluded without hesitation to be certain of the other. 
Thus tho’ the mixture of humours and the composition of minute parts may justly 
be presum’d to be somewhat different in men from what it is in mere animals; and 
therefore any experiment we make upon the one concerning the effects of medicines 
will not always apply to the other; yet as the structure of the veins and muscles, the 
fabric and situation of the heart, of the lungs, the stomach, the liver and other parts, 
are the same or nearly the same in all animals, the very same hypothesis, which in 
one species explains muscular motion, the progress of the chyle, the circulation of the 
blood, must be applicable to every one; and according as it agrees or disagrees with 
the experiments we may make in any species of creatures, we may draw a proof of its 
truth or falsehood on the whole. Let us, therefore, apply this method of enquiry, which 
is found so just and useful in reasonings concerning the body, to our present anatomy 
of the mind, and see what discoveries we can make by it (T, 211-212). 
Hume is implicitly comparing his anatomy of the mind with Harvey’s anatomy 
of bodies, as the recurring references to the circulation of the blood seem to 
suggest. The comparison of Hume’s work on mind to that on physical anatomy 
is so important that it occurs also in the conclusion of the Treatise and in the first 
section of the Enquiry, where the Scottish philosopher opposes the unentertaining 
but useful investigations of the anatomist to the graceful and engaging, but useless 
work of the painter (T, 395; E, 8).
In his recent research on Hume as a historian of science, Spencer K. Wertz 
has argued that Harvey was for the Scottish philosopher the idol of scientific 
achievement, more than Isaac Newton, and that De motu cordis (1628) was the 
only work to reach such a degree of perfection as to provide a model for empirical 
sciences.22 If our reconstruction of Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas 
is correct, and if Harvey was the source of the Scottish philosopher’s distinction, we 
can provide Wertz’s argument with further evidence: we may say that Harvey was 
important from a historical standpoint not only for his scientific achievements, but 
also for his logic of ideas, which can be rightly considered a precursor of Hume’s 
empirical epistemology. 
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22 Cf. Spencer K. Wertz, “Hume and the Historiography of Science,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 
54 (1993): 411-36, esp. 434-35.
